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DIVIDEND SIGNALING AND SMOOTHING: A NOTE
ABSTRACT
This paper examines how a change in the firm's risk (thus, the firm's
intrinsic value) affects optimal dividends when dividends serve to signal
shareholders of the firm's value. If the signaling cost of dividend is less
than a certain amount, managers have incentives to smooth dividend payout.
An increase in the frim's risk (i.e., a decrease in the firm's intrinsic
value) may lead the manager to increase dividends.
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Introduction
Since Lintner [7], it has been a well-known fact that managers smooth
dividend payout. In recent years, dividend .smoothing has become an important
issue in the study of stock market rationality; see Marsh and Merton [8, 9]
and Kleidon [6, p. 976]. For example, Marsh and Merton [8] suggest
If stock prices are rational, then why do dividends
exhibit so little volatility relative to stock prices?
. . . managers choose dividend policies so as to smooth
the effect of changes in intrinsic values (and hence,
rational stock prices) on the change in dividends (p. 495).
The objective of this paper is to integrate the dividend smoothing
behavior into the signaling theory of dividends developed by Bhattacharya
[3, 4] and others. Though the signaling theory has emerged to be a plausi-
ble explanation about why firms pay dividends, none of the earlier studies
have explicitly considered the dividend smoothing behavior within the
signaling equilibrium framework.
In brief, it will be shown that if the signaling cost of dividends is
less than a certain amount, a decrease in the firm's intrinsic value leads
the manager to increase dividends.
I. Model
For pedagogical purpose, the Bhattacharya model is simplified by the
following assumptions, Al through A7.
Al . There are two states of world and two periods. The beginning of
the first period is denoted by t = 0, the end of the first period by t = 1,
and the end of the second period by t = 2.
See John and Williams [5], Miller and Rock [10], and Ambarish, John
and Williams [1], among others.
o
See Asquith and Mullins [2] for empirical evidence of the informa-
tional content of dividends, and the references therein.
A2 . There are two groups of risk averse shareholders, original share-
holders and outside shareholders. Original shareholders sell the firm to
outside shareholders at t = 1. Shareholders' certainty equivalent to random
return, R, is expressed as E(R) - 8o 2 (R); where E is the expectations
operator, 8 (> 0) is the risk aversion parameter, and o 2 is the variance
operator.
A3 . There are two types of investment projects. At t = 0, the manager,
acting on behalf of original shareholders, chooses either project g or
project b. The manager's project choice is unobservable to outside share-
holders. The costs of undertaking projects g and b are, respectively, Cg and
Cb ; where Cg
> Cb .
A4 . The firm's realized earnings are also unobservable to outside
shareholders. Let random variables R_ and Rb be earnings of projects g and
b, respectively, at the end of each period with the following probability
distributions:
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where e is a positive constant, and < B < 1. The probability distributions
are common knowledge. E ( RR )
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( Rb^* Hereafter, we
call project g the good project, and project b the bad project.
3Definition . The (relative) risk of the good project is measured by 6.
A5 . There is no personal income tax.
A6 . There is no time value of money.
A7 . At t = 0, the manager publicly announces and commits the amount of
dividends, D (X-Be < D < X+Be), to be paid at t = 1 to original shareholders.
If realized earnings exceed dividend commitment at t = 1, the excess is
accrued to original shareholders. If realized earnings are short of dividend
commitment, the shortfall is financed at the expense of original sharehold-
ers. The financing cost is h (> 0) for every dollar borrowed.
In sum, at t = 0, the manager, acting on behalf of original sharehold-
ers, chooses either the good or bad project; and announces the amount of
dividends to be paid at t = 1 for original shareholders. At t = 1, the
firm's earnings are realized; dividends are paid to original shareholders;
and the firm is sold to outside shareholders. At t = 2, the firm's earnings
are realized; and the firm is liquidated with zero salvage value. Informa-
tion asymmetry means that outside shareholders cannot observe the firm's
project choice and realized earnings. The critical assumption to achieve a
signaling equilibrium is that dividends are costly (i.e., financing costs if
realized earnings are short of dividends).
Finally, the distributions of returns to original shareholders net of
financing costs at t = 1, R^ - Ti (i = g or b), are described as follows:
For example, suppose that the bad project represents the market
portfolio. Then, B = Cov(R ,Rb )/o
2 (Rb )
ysis, pt
equilibrium itself.
In our anal ersonal tax is inconsequential to the signaling
Rg- Fg
Rb - Fb
Therefore,
E(R - F ) = X - .5h(D - X + Be),
E(Rb - Fb ) = X - .5h(D - X + e),
2 (R
g
- F ) = .25(2Be + h(D - X + Be)) 2
,
2 (Rh - FK ) = .25(2e + h(D - X + e)) 2 . (1)
II. Signaling Equilibrium
A signaling equilibrium is established when outside shareholders' con-
jecture about the manager's project choice is self-fulfilled. For example,
suppose outside shareholders' conjecture that the manager has chosen the good
project. For a given price outside shareholders are willing to pay for the
firm, V, the manager's project choice will be consistent with outside share-
holders' conjecture if and only if
- C
g
+ {E(R
g
- F
g
) - 6o 2 (R
g
- F
g )}
+ V
> - Cb + {E(Rb - Fb ) - 9o
2 (Rb - Fb )} + V. (2)
Inequality (2) is re-written as
- C + X - .5h(D-X+Be) - .258(26e + h(D-X+Be))
> - CK + X - .5h(D-X+e) - .258(2e + h(D-X+e)) 2 . (3)
JL, JL,
Inequality (3) is solved for D such that if D > D' , then outside share-
holders' conjecture about the manager's project choice is self -fulfilled:
D* = X
2AC
8(2+h) 9h(2+h)(l-B)e
2+h
2h
(1+B)e (4)
where AC C_ - Cb -
Given that the manager has chosen the good project, the expected return
to original shareholders is maximized when D = D . Hence, D is called the
optimal amount of dividends.
Proposition. Assume that h < 2>lAC
>T8(l-6)e
The optimal amount of
dividends increases when the firm's risk increases.
(proof) 3D* > ., Miu2 < 4AC
_-
- if and only if (2+h) 2 -
B(1 .B) a e g
III. Summary
For dividends to serve as a signal of the firm's value, dividends should
be costly, < h < •». If the signaling cost of dividends is less than a
certain amount, managers smooth the effect of a change in the firm's intrinsic
value on the change in dividends.
r
^We assume that the expected return from the good project with D is
greater than that from the bad project with zero dividend.
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